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Reardon:
Medical Clinics: Legal and Political Structure in Group
Practice
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
[Vol. XXVIII
LAW REVIEW

To check such pervasive abuses and to assure the fullest possible public
disclosure of information, Congress empowered the federal district courts
to determine, in suits involving Exemption one of the FOIA, whether the
executive branch has complied with its own rules regarding the classification of national security information. Courts inevitably will face difficult and
sensitive situations in exercising this new review power. Yet given the mandate of the amended FOIA and the clarity of Congress' intent to insure
meaningful judicial review, courts should not lightly interpret the responsibility
of the government under the Act. The government is required to sustain the
burden of persuasion that its invocation of Exemption one is proper. Courts
should carefully avoid procedures or devices that allow the government to
evade this statutory responsibility and should require a degree of specificity
in the government's arguments sufficient to enable maximum adversary exchange without actually disclosing the contested document. Furthermore,
courts should insist on meritorious arguments on the part of the government
and not presumptively accept mere pro forma executive assurances that withholding is justified. Only through adherence to these minimum requirements
can the courts guarantee that the doctrine of maximum disclosure1 23 embodied
in the FOA will not be thwarted.
HowARD ROFFMAN

MEDICAL CLINICS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE
IN GROUP PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION

Group practice is a rapidly expanding mode for the delivery of health
care in the United States, and is expected to become the dominant pattern
break-in was imminent, he discussed possible public justifications with his aides, John Dean
and H.R. Haldeman. In a tape recorded conversation on March 21, 1973, President Nixon
concluded "[o]n that one I think we should simply say this was a national security investigation that was conducted." Institutional Author, THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRITs 163
(New York Times ed. 1974).
123. Justice Stewart has suggested that "the hallmark of a truly effective internal
security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can
best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained." New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). This statement is premised
on the assumption that "when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the
system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated
by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion." Id. at 729.
1. The total number of medical groups in the United States rose from 404 in 1946
to 1,546 in 1959; 4,239 in 1965; and 6,371 in 1969. U.S. DEP'T F
HEW, PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, HEALTH RESOURCES STATISTICS 487

(1973) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICS].
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of medical practice in the near future.2 This trend is encouraged by federal
and state sponsorship of health maintenance organizations3 and by the
general drift of the health care system toward socialization; group practice
is well structured to thrive in the environment of prepaid medical services,
national health insurance, and national health planning by the government.
Prior to the recent governmental interest in health care, however, medical
practitioners had begun to associate for other, more fundamental reasons.4
Many doctors believed that the economies of scale, professional discipline,
and centralized business management of group practice afforded a better
quality of medical care to the public. 5 Furthermore, doctors appreciated the
many personal benefits of group practice: regular hours of responsibility,
greater tax advantages and 'fringe benefits, more opportunity for continued
education and political activity, added security for referral-dependent
specialists, and relief from administrative tasks.6 It is apparent from the
success of older groups and the proliferation of new groups that these expectations have been largely fulfilled. Such results are not surprising, since
group practice is a pattern that has long been successful in the legal profession.7
The terms "group practice" and "clinic" have spawned considerable confusion. "Group practice," as used herein, refers to a group of doctors
2. See Code, Determinants of Medical Care-A Plan for the Future, in NEw HORIZONS
IN HEALTH CARE 53 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEw HoRizoNs].
3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§280c, 200 - 300e-14 (Supp. II 1973); FLA. STAT. §§641.17-.38 (1975).
See generally Epstein,HMOs and the Law: How to Avoid Problems With State Statutes,
GROUP PRACTICE, Aug. 1973, at 9; Feldman, Legislation and Prepayment for Group Practice,
47 BLuu N.Y. AcAr. MED. 411 (1971); Hoffheimer, The ABCs of HMOs, GROUP PRACTICE,

SepL.-Oct. 1974, at 25.
4. The leader in the establishment of private group practice is generally acknowledged
to be the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. The idea of cooperative group practice
pioneered by the Mayo brothers is considered by some doctors to be the most important
practical achievement in the delivery of modem medicine. H. CLAPESATTLE, THE DoCToRs
MAYO 534, 575-76 (1941) [hereinafter cited as H. CLAPESATrLE]. See also W. WIN.LOW, THE
MENNINGER STORY 16, 175 (1956).
5. Dr. William Mayo commented: "Properly considered, group medicine is not a
financial arrangement, except for minor details, but a scientific cooperation for the welfare

of the sick. Medicine's place is fixed by its service to mankind; if we doctors fail to measure
up to an opportunity it means state medicine, political control, mediocrity, and loss of
professional ideals. The members of the medical fraternity must cooperate in this work ....
The internist, the surgeon, and the specialist must join with the physiologist, the pathologist,
and the laboratory workers to form the clinical group, which must also include men
learned in the abstract sciences, since physics and biochemistry are leading medicine to
greater heights. Union of all these forces will lengthen by many years the span of human
life, and as a by-product will do much to improve professional ethics by overcoming some of
the evils of competitive medicine." H. CLAPESATi=L, supra note 4, at 706 (emphasis

original).
6. See

OF MEDICAL CLINICS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, &
ASSOCIATION, GROUP PRACTICE: GUIDELINES TO JOINING OR
FORMING A MEDICAL GROUP 10 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES].
7. "Group practice" in the legal profession is often used to designate prepaid legal
service plans, but the analogy here is simply to the large law firm with specialized lawyers
and departments.
MEDICAL

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

GROUP

MANAGEMENT
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operating as a private business entity with a common administrative staff,
common facilities, and centralized patient records and accounts. The term
is sometimes used to indicate prepaid medical care s exclusively, but its meaning here will include both prepayment and fee-for-service systems. True group
practice should be distinguished from the space-sharing arrangement, often
called a "medical arts building." While a number of doctors might be partners
or shareholders in a "medical arts building," they usually do not have the
merged professional practices characteristic of true groups. 9 "Clinic" will be
used interchangeably with "group practice" and will carry no connotation
of public subsidy or lower cost. Although groups of one specialty (for example,
radiology, anesthesiology) or one purpose (for example, diagnosis) do exist,
the typical group of more than seven contains doctors with a wide variety
of specialties so that patients can fulfill all their medical needs without going
elsewhere. 10
Planning and forming a medical group requires greater legal skill and
care than does the establishment of a typical small business. The clinic must
be organized in a recognized legal form that, along with the documents
creating it, will determine the basic rights and duties of the group and of
its members. For a multispecialty clinic, however, this framework will not
provide a sufficient foundation for a stable enterprise. The group must also
be given a comprehensive political structure at its inception. Thus, the lawyer's
role transcends technical advice on the clinic's formation; he must also advise
the group in its four major political areas - choice of entity, management
structure, distribution of income, and risk management." While this commentary will consider these internal political areas within the framework of
the partnership form of organization, many of the problem-solving techniques
can be applied to other forms of organization as well.
CHOICE OF ENTITY

Comparisons of the business entities available to a group practice typically
imply that clinic operations normally fall under the aegis of a single entity.12
Surveys have found, however, that nearly all established groups operate as
clusters of two or more entities related somewhat horizontally as coventurers,
rather than vertically as parent and subsidiary. 13 These separate entities are
8. See generally Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical
Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REV. 887 (1971).

9. See H.

CLAPESATrLE,

supra note 4, at 576.

10. STATISTICS, supra note I, at 489.
11. The recommendation is made in a basic work on group practice that the attorney
be engaged on a retainer basis and be thoroughly involved with the clinic's activities to the
extent that: "He should be considered one of the group. He should attend quarterly
meetings of the clinic and should be invited to all social functions of the organization."
Garrett, Legal and Financial Counsel, in THE PHYSICIAN AND GROUP PRACTICE 158-59 (E.
Jordan ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Jordan].
12. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLINIC MANAGERS, THE CLINIC MANAGER'S MfANUAL
3-2 (1958) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
13. See GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 22; Note, Group Medical Practice and Clinics:
Some Organizational Problems, 4 STAN. L. RpV. 401, 411 (1952).
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planned along functional lines - one for the actual practice of medicine, another for the management and ownership of clinic real estate and equipment, 14
and others for ancillary activities's such as laboratories, pharmacies, hospitals,
research foundations, or prepayment plans. These entity clusters have proven
useful in segregating the return on the doctors' capital from their earned
income, avoiding conflicts of interest, reducing taxes, and compartmentalizing
the management of separate activities. The cluster approach depends heavily
on the special circumstances of the group, and since its complications cannot
be developed in a general description of the clinic's structure, discussion will
be limited to the political framework of the medical practice entity.
The most common forms of organization for the medical practice entity
are sole proprietorship, unincorporated association, partnership, and corporation. 16 Sole proprietorship (to be distinguished from solo practice) can
rarely survive in a multispecialty clinic.'7 Though multispecialty groups
may evolve from sole proprietorships, it is unusual to find a clinic of more
than fifteen doctors with one owner.'8 The capital requirements preclude all
but the exceptionally wealthy proprietor, and the medical specialists needed
to staff such a clinic normally insist on ownership opportunities.
The unincorporated association is a hybrid designed to take advantage
of the best elements of partnership and incorporation, 0 particularly with
respect to taxes and protection from certain types of liability. Because it is
often unclear as to what legal principles apply to an association, its legal
predictability is low.2 0 Also questionable is whether a form of organization
that evolved principally for loosely-organized dubs and societies is appropriate
for a cohesive, profit-making business. The appeal of the association is now
largely eliminated by the availability of incorporation. The organizational
problems of management and control in an association are likely to be the
same as in a large partnership.
The major choice of entity for a medical group is the choice between
partnership and incorporation. Overwhelmingly, partnership was the pattern
of group practice until the late 1960's.21 Until that time, most states proSee Hirsh, The Medical Partnership,13 DE PAUL L. REv. 28, 32 (1963).
See MANUAL, supra note 12, at 3-32.
16. The foundation has also been used. Id. at 3-27. See also Eisenberg. There's a
Medical Foundation in Your Future, MED. EcoN., Sept. 27, 1971, at 88. This form of
organization, however, is not generally used as the primary clinic entity.
17. See Jordan, Sole Proprietorship,in Jordan, supra note 11, at 94.
18. Sole proprietorships accounted for only 4.9% of multispecialty groups of all sizes
in 1969. SrATscncs, supra note I, at 493.
19. See MANUAL, supra note 12, at 3-20.
20. The most controversial topic has been corporate tax treatment, on which a plethora
has been written. See, e.g., Maier & Wild, Taxation of Professional Firms as Corporations,
44 MARq. L. REv. 127 (1960); Note, Qualified Pension Plans for UnincorporatedProfessional
Associations, 12 STAN. L. REv. 746 (1960); Comment, Corporate Income Tax Treatment for
Professional Groups, 26 ALBANY L. REv. 246 (1962). The uncertainty of the law is similarly
objectionable in the rare use of the Massachusetts business trust as the form of a clinic.
See generally C. RoHRLcn, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES §§4A3-A8
(4th ed. 1967).
14.

15.

21. Eighty-five percent of surveyed groups in 1959 were partnerships. U.S. DEP'T oF
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hibited incorporation of medical groups on the theory that only natural per22
sons could fulfill the licensing requirements of their medical practice acts.
These laws were liberalized by all of the states in a short period 2 3 however,
and many medical groups rushed to incorporate. The principal reason for
the change was the restrictiveness of Keogh retirement plans 24 in comparison
to the tax advantages of corporate pension and profit-sharing plans.25 The
Pension Reform Act of 197426 has lessened considerably the hypothetical tax
advantages of incorporation causing other factors to become correspondingly
more important in the choice of an entity.
With the artificial tax incentive of incorporation 27 largely neutralized,
the choice of business organization should be made by determining which
form is more compatible with the basic nature of the service. The risk of
organizing under a form incompatible with that service is that the quality
of the service and the reputation of the organization may be injured in subtle
ways. When the fundamental differences between self-employment and
corporate existence are considered, there emerge several reasons pointing
toward partnership as the preferable form of organization for medical groups.
The history of the modern corporation shows that it came into prominence
to effect the centralization of capital, labor, and management.28 Traditionally,
HmW, PUBLIC HEALTH

SERVICE,

MEDICAL GROUPS IN TIlE UNITED STATES, 1959

110

(1963). By

1969 this share had dropped to 68.7%. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 493.
22. See, e.g., People ex rel. State Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal.
2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938); People by Kerner v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200
N.E. 157 (1936); State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905).
23. One of the landmark cases in the area of corporate tax treatment of professional
groups was United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), which involved the
taxation of a medical clinic. The Treasury regulations that resulted from this case led
professionals to lobby vigorously for state statutes sanctioning professional corporations,
which would allow such entities to come under the regulation in order to enjoy corporate
tax treatment. By December 1971, within ten years from the passage of the first act of
this type, all states had enacted such laws. For a summary and comparative tabulation of
these statutes, see Eaton, Professional Corporations and Associations, 17 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §9.01 (1973). See also FLA. STAT. §§621.01-.15 (1975), the first of the statutes to be
generally applicable to the several professions employing the "corporation" name; Dunn,
Professional Corporations: Their Development and Present Status With Respect to the
Practice of Medicine, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 625 (1972).
24. Keogh plans are tax-qualified retirement plans for self-employed persons and their
employees established under the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, 76
Stat. 809 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
25. See Report of the Committee on Pension and Profit-sharingTrusts, in ABA SECTION
OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE &-TRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 135 (1963); Ray, A Comparison
of Tax Benefits Available Under HR-O With Those Prov'ided by Professional Associations.
26 GA. S. B.J. 269 (1964).
26. See note 83 infra.
27. The House Ways and Means Committee's summary of the bill commented under
the heading, "Unjustifiable differences in tax treatment of corporate owner-employees and
self-employed individuals under qualified plans": "The fact that pension contributions on
behalf of corporate employees are in practice not subject to control has also given rise
to claims of discrimination on the part of self-employed persons. Pension contributions
made by self-employed persons on their own behalf are limited to 10 percent of earned income
up to $2500 a year under present law. These limits also have had the undesirable effect
of inducing many individuals, including professional people, who would normally carry
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corporate policy is made at the highest levels, those farthest removed from the
actual product of the corporation. Health care, however, is not the kind of
product that lends itself to centralized judgment and authority; medical
policy and ethics are developed and exercised at the primary level of organization- the doctor-patient relationship.
The medical profession is not beyond criticism for its management of
the health care system, but the greatest achievements of that system may be
largely due to the independence and responsibility enjoyed by the physician
in the tradition of self-employment. Although it is true that incorporation
of physicians has been motivated primarily by financial incentives, 21 and not
a desire to avoid responsibility, and that the attitude of the physician does
not deteriorate overnight when his practice is incorporated, the long-run
tendency of the employed doctor (even the shareholder-employee) may be to
conform to the natural shape of corporate life and to develop an employee
mentality in place of a professional posture.30 Resistence to this trend would
take a constant expenditure of personal energy and attention, which experience shows is difficult to sustain.
Although incorporation promises advantages to doctors that the lawyer
should consider when advising a group, careful analysis of the group's situation often shows that these benefits are merely theoretical-' or marginal.32
on their activities as sole proprietors or partners, to convert their activities to the corporate
form almost entirely to secure the greater tax advantages associated with corporate plans."
H.R. REP. No. 93-779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).
28. See R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §1 (2d ed. 1949).
29. "The principle consideration in favor of incorporation for the AAMC members was
the corporate tax advantages, particularly deferred income and pension plans. The most
frequently cited factors against incorporation were widespread doubts concerning the
possibility of future shifts in IRS policy and future legislation, which might reduce the
tax advantages of incorporation or increase those of the partnership." Prager & Hunter,
Partnershipsor Professional Corporations:A Reappraisal,GRouP PRAcricE, Jan. 1971, at 16.

30. Dr. M.J. Halberstam has framed this problem in the concept of "personnel,"
which he defined as "someone whose work obligations are defined by the organization which
employs him." Under this view, physicians are not, or should not be, "personnel" because
they are defined by oath and peer group outside the organization. A middle group also
exists, made up of certain professionals who function at the will of a city department
or agency, such as teachers and social workers; these are "professional personnel," whose
organizations hold the final responsibility for their practices. Dr. Halberstam comments:
"It is obvious from this definition-and from the experience of many of us here-that
there are times when the physician himself functions as 'professional personnel.'" Halberstam, Radical Politics and the Future of Solo Practice,in NEw HORIZONS, supra note 2, at 835
(1970). "These less tangible considerations can be summarized in terms of how well the
organizational form, partnership or corporation, fits the concept of group practice as
defined by the members of the group . . One consideration frequently mentioned by
AAMC members in the survey cited was the loss of individual independence and control
which some physicians feel is an inevitable result of incorporation." Prager & Hunter,
supra note 29, at 17.
31. In the process of analyzing the tax treatment of professional corporations, one
commentator has written an enlightening, if somewhat antagonistic, appraisal of the
"corporateness" of organizations formed under the early enabling statute as it relates to
limited liability (professional and business), centralized management, continuity of life,
and free transferability of interest. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income
Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REV. 1 (1961).
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The doctors, on consideration of the subjective factors that will affect their
practices for decades, may prefer to retain the private, decentralized, professionally oriented partnership format that is so conducive to the practice
of medicine.
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Because of the large number of partners in the typical multispecialty
clinic, a formal management plan should be written as part of the partnership agreement or as a separate document for the partnership agreement to
incorporate by reference2 a This plan, or reference to it, should also appear
in the clinic's standard contract for employed doctors, who are, as a rule,
prospective partners serving a probationary period of employed service.
There are two parallel branches of management in clinics - medical
practice management and business management.3 4 Management of the medical
practice, of course, must be the sole responsibility of the doctors, especially
the partners. Business administration is largely delegated to lay managers 33
who assume executive responsibility for a wide variety of clinic functions3 6
(such as billing, purchasing, personnel, and maintenance). Since partners retain the top management function in business administration, provision
should be made in the management plan to subject each area of the business
operation to periodic review by some component of the partnership. Overall
management responsibility is normally exercised by a governing body or
authority augmented by various committees. There are nearly as many different
management systems as there are clinics,3 7 but the various plans fall into

several patterns.
The most basic system is total democracy, whereby all decisions come

32. To reap the extra advantage of corporate pension plans requires the permanent
commitment of large amounts of cash that must be foregone for the purposes of personal
consumption or investment in medical facilities. A survey has shown that doctors' preferences
for the corporate form are directly proportional to income and that only in the income
strata above $80,000 a year do the majority of doctors practice as corporations. Gorlick,
How Much Should You Earn to Make Incorporation Pay?, MED. ECON., Feb. 18, 1974, at 105.
33. See Hirsch, The Medical Partnership, 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 28, 32-33 (1963).
34. Examination of management plans and charts collected by the Group Practice Information Service of the American Group Practice Association showed that this sharp
division of the business function from the professional function is virtually universal,
regardless of the form of the organization. See also MANUAL, supra note 12, at 5-7.
35. The occupation, "clinic manager," has evolved into a new professional category.
Id., ch. 1. The National Association of Clinic Managers was founded in 1926 and
has been succeeded by the Medical Group Management Association, which had over 800
members in 1969. See GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 32-33. High standards of proficiency
are stressed and may be rewarded through a testing program leading to Fellowship in
the American College of Clinic Managers founded in 1956. Id.; see MANUAL, supra note 12,
at 20.
36. See H. CorrON, MEDICAL GROUP PRAcricE 65 (1965) [hereinafter cited as H. CorrON];
Heberlein, The Clinic Manager, in Jordan, supra note 11, at 144-50.
37. Some of the methods used in California groups are listed in Note, Group Medical
Practice and Clinics: Some Organizational Problems, 4 STAN. L. Rav. 401, 407 (1952).
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before all of the partners. 38 For a group of more than six or seven partners,

the disadvantages of this system are obvious - the difficulty of assembling a
meeting, the waste of the doctors' time resulting from the geometric increase
in discussion as the number of partners increases, and the desire of some
doctors to practice medicine and leave the management of the clinic to those
who are interested in such matters.
A good alternative to pure democracy is the functional responsibility approach whereby certain management areas, such as collections or insurance,
are the responsibility of particular committees 9 that periodically report
results and developments to the group as a whole. These appointments may
be semipermanent to allow the doctors to pursue a special interest or to
become knowledgeable on some facet of group practice management.
A managing partner,40 one doctor who assumes overall responsibility, may
emerge from the nucleus of a group, but he is likely to serve on an informal
basis. As a formal structure, this system has the defect of requiring outstanding
leadership qualities from the managing partner, and such an individual may
not always be available. A managing partner should be distinguished from
a medical director,4 1 who holds executive-type authority in the medical
practice area similar to the business manager's executive authority in the
administrative area.
The dominant management pattern for large groups is the executive
committee system, 42 similar in design to the executive committee system for
corporate boards of directors. It is necessary, as in the corporate structure, to
carefully delineate the powers of the executive committee to clearly indicate
when the partners as a whole must be consulted. 43 This system raises some
problems regarding the selection of committee members. The interests of
each partner must be represented, and this is sometimes achieved by rotating
the committee membership. Moreover, it is necessary to consider departmental representation and differences in experience, interest, length of service,
and senior or junior partner status. The employed doctors are often represented
on the committee, and the business manager may be an ex officio member.
The members of a medical partnership share practice quarters, financial
rewards, patients, liability, and reputation, so it is of paramount importance
that the partnership agreement contain effective disciplinary sanctions against
errant colleagues. 44 Several degrees of sanctions are available. Minor measures
38. See H. CoTroN, supra note 56, at 59.

59. The Mayo Clinic developed such a system of standing committees in the 1920's
as a transitional step toward self-government by the staff. Beyond the educational effect of
these committees on the doctors, this system had a political effect as well. "When any
member got so full of his own and his specialty's importance that he could not see the
rights of the other sections in the organization, the board of governors had only to appoint
him to some important committee. Dealing there with the problems of the whole group,
he soon had a better understanding of the relationship of his own block to the whole
structure and was ever afterward more amenable." H. CLAPESATTLE, supra note 4, at 703.
40. See H. CoTroN, supra note 56, at 61.
41. See Gray, The Role of the Medical Director, GRouP PRAcTncE, Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 15.
42. See Sedgwick, Leadership and the Executive Board, in Jordan, supra note 11, at 75-75.
43. Id. at 75.
44. The liability of the clinic can extend beyond what would normally be considered
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the private "talking-to," 45 the official re-

4;
personal exclusion, and the withholding of privileges. Beyond these

informal penalties, discipline in the clinic should be formally prescribed by
the agreement. The intermediate penalties are financial: fines, reduction of
income shares, reduction of bonuses, loss of points under a point system,
or any other method consistent with the group's income distribution system.4,
Financial penalties and expulsion from the partnership usually require a
vote of all partners, and it is likely that the doctors forming a group will
want to require more than a simple majority approval for such action. 49 For
various reasons, some salutary and some self-serving, doctors are loathe to
take personal action against other doctors. 50 Therefore, the more assistance
the attorney can give the partnership by specifying the grounds for discipline
in the agreement, the more effective the disciplinary powers will be. Without
this specificity, the group may be psychologically cornered. 51
INCOME DISTRIBUTION

The most controversial problem in many groups is how to divide the
earnings. This subject can lead the group into bitter and time-consuming
debate-or even dissolution-if a workable system of distribution is not
planned at the outset. 52 'The basic objective is allocation of revenue and
profits, but the system must also comprehend the related factors of overhead,
time off, sabbaticals, vacation, disability, and unpopular duties. The symbolic
value of money makes income distribution particularly delicate because
professional or business relations. See Maclay v. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, 456 S.W.2d 229, 232
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Comment, A Duty to Prevent a Copartner From Alienating the
Affections of a Patient's Wife is Owed by a Medical Partnership to the Families of its
Patients, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 152 (1971).
45. "[T]alking-to seems to involve various blends of instruction, friendly persuasion
of error, shaming the offender, and threatening him with retaliation." Freidson & Rhea,
Processes of Control in a Company of Equals, 11 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 119, 125 (1963).
46. See H. COTrON, supra note 36, at 53-54.
47. Personal exclusion in a clinic means that the offender is not referred patients,
is not consulted about problems in his specialty, is not called on to look at interesting
cases, and is not included in the system of exchanging favors. The loss of privileges involves
rewards such as extra money, serving as a special consultant, supervising a research program, representing the group to distinguished visitors, traveling at clinic expense, or
taking leaves of absence. Freidson & Rhea, supra note 45, at 127.
48. See H. COTTON,supra note 36, at 55.
49. Id. at 57; Gordon, The Partnership,in Jordan, supra note 11, at 78-79.
50. See Freidson & Rhea, supra note 45, at 128-29.
51. "The system is quite helpless in the face of a man who does not depend upon
the esteem and trust of his colleagues and who does not respond to the symbolic values of
Confronted by a man who is not so incompetent or unethical as to
professionalism ....
be grossly and obviously dismissible, and who fails to show any pride as a professional, the
administration and the colleague group are helpless. He cannot be flattered, shamed, or
insulted and so cannot be persuaded to mend his ways or resign; all that can be done is to
seal him off and try to minimize whatever damage he is believed to do." Id. at 129.
at 129.
52. See Owens, Many Partners Are Still Doing It Wrong, MED. ECON., March 4, 1974,
at 129.
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the expression of each doctor's contribution or value to the group as an
exact dollar figure is unavoidable. 53 It is difficult to compare the earnings
of a group doctor to the earnings of a solo practitioner. 54 For example, many
fringe benefits and expenses are clinic-paid, and the return on invested capital
is usually separated from medical practice earnings through the use of a
corporation that owns the assets.55 Thus, the group approach to medical
practice will cause the individual doctor's lifetime income curve to differ
from his expected earnings in solo practice, and the lawyer should ensure
that the partners are aware of these differences when designing the income
distribution plan.
Group doctors can expect two leveling effects on income. Under almost
any distribution scheme, the most remunerative specialties subsidize the less
remunerative specialties to some degree. 56 This subsidy may be required for
the clinic to maintain a full spectrum of specialties, 57 but it is also an indicator
of the cooperative spirit of group practice. The second leveling effect is
that clinic income plans tend to smooth out the peaks and valleys of an individual doctor's lifetime earnings curve. In group practice, the younger
doctors reach full capacity and income very quickly, and the older doctors
near retirement are generally protected by the plan from the severe income
decline that older solo practitioners often experience. 58 These benefits come
at the cost of a lower income peak in midcareer.
The lawyer who negotiates an income distribution plan should draft
specific terms (for example, "production," ".years of service") ensuring that
the plan is predictable, easy to amend, 59 and sufficient for resolving unforeseen
happenings. In a medium-sized or large group, a compensation committee is
useful for administering the system and for making recommendations to the
entire partnership.
An income distribution plan will fall somewhere on the continuum between equal compensation and incentive compensation, usually correlative
with the group philosophy toward either cooperation or competition. The
simplest distribution plan provides that each partner is to receive a fixed,
equal share of the group's distributable income. This system is unappealing
to highly motivated individuals and to those who practice highly remunerative
specialties, and it is also open to abuse by individual partners. Despite these

53. See Beck, Dividing the Pie, GROUP PRAcIcE, Sept. 1973, at 9.
54. Aggregate figures do not reflect much difference in earnings. While a 1968 survey
showed solo practitioners earning a mean net income in 1967 of $29,771, group practitioners
earned a mean net income of $31,000. GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 20. Some of this
difference may be accounted for by the concentration of specialists in group practice.
55.

Id. at 22.

56. See Clark, Forged in Your Own Mold, GROUP PRAcGTcE, Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 20.
57. Id. at 22. One response to the AAMC survey of income distribution plans specifically
provided a subsidy for pediatricians, normally the lowest revenue producers.
58. Id. at 20.
59. Id. at 21-22. "Most income distribution formulas contrived by physician associates
in medical groups have one thing-in common: they are seldom permanent. Plans have
been altered as many as three or four times in a ten-year period .
GUIDELINES, supra
note 6, at 22.
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shortcomings, it has been used successfully by many groups,6 ° presumably to
the satisfaction of doctors who desire a very cooperative professional environment. 61
A fixed share plan may be designed with unequal shares. One suggested
plan 62 uses national statistics on the incomes of doctors in the various
specialties to determine the expectation of a competent established doctor in
each specialty. These norms are then converted into points which reflect the
economic prospects of each specialty relative to all others. Adjustments are
made for major career factors such as recent entry into the specialty or department directorships. The norms are based on specific data and recomputation every few years can be required by the plan.
At the other end of the continuum is compensation according to individual
productivity, which gives greater reward to the competitive and ambitious
urges of the doctors. 63 Incentive plans carry the strong appeal of being
equitable in the free enterprise tradition; but carried to excess, they defeat
some of the cooperative benefits of group practice. When an incentive plan
is desired by the group, the lawyer must insist that well-defined terms be
included in the partnership agreement or supplementary document. The
most basic term is "productivity." A doctor's contribution could be measured
by number of patients, number of patient visits, hours worked, charges logged,
charges collected, or profits attributable to his efforts. Partners should be
advised that results of these indicators may vary considerably, and when a
unit of contribution is chosen, it should be clearly defined and explained to
foreclose later problems.
Most multispecialty groups merge the principles of equal compensation
6
and incentive compensation into combination income distribution plans. 4
Such combination plans can be implemented with any convenient calculation
method once it is decided what factors will be taken into consideration in
the overall plan. Point systems are very common methods of calculating income shares. Factors often built in include publication and research, board
certification, nonmedical community work, seniority, founder status, education, experience, specialty, service as an officer of a medical society, and many
others.

60. In 1973, 58% of medical partnerships shared income equally. Owens, supra note 52,
at 130. This figure, however, conceals some important differences among certain types of
groups that show up in further breakdowns of the survey data. Only 33)% of mixed
specialty partnerships shared equally, compared to 66% of the single specialty partnerships.
Also, only 35% in the category of partnerships of four or more M.D.'s shared equally,
while 74% and 68% of partnerships of two and three M.D.'s, respectively, shared equally.
Id. at 134-35. The incidence of equal sharing continues to drop as the number of partners

increases. See note 64 infra.
61. See Beck, supra note 53, at 10.
62. See H. CorrON, supra note 36, at 46-50.
63. See Beck, supra note 53, at 11.
64. A survey of the American Group Practice Association (formerly American Association of Medical Clinics), which is composed of relatively large, predominantly multispecialty clinics, indicated that 85.5% used a combination plan, while 7% shared equally
and 7.5% based income solely on productivity. Clark, supra note 56, at 19-20.
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As an income distribution plan becomes more detailed, it also becomes
costlier to administer in terms of time, money, and potential antagonism
among partners. Though there are many legitimate factors that have a
bearing on equitable income distribution, the final results of a complicated
formula will probably not differ drastically from those of a simpler version.
It is inevitable that as the income distribution system moves toward the
competitive model, the allocation of profits becomes more difficult. Income
distribution, however, cannot be isolated from work distribution, which
operates inversely-the more competitive the compensation, the easier it is
to allocate workloads. The closer the income system is to equal shares, the
more difficult are the problems of time off, minimum productivity, and unpopular duties. The lawyer should urge that written policies in the partnership agreement or separate document cover various work distribution areas,
including sabbaticals,6 5 educational and military leaves of absence, service
in political or medical offices, and attendance at meetings.
RISK MANAGEMENT

All the risks associated with property and broad exposure to the public
are present in the medical clinic operation. The management of these risks
is a continuing responsibility that requires the attention of the executive
committee and the business manager. The lawyer also may be closely involved
in the evaluation and approval of insurance coverage for these risks. The
subject of this section, however, is the category of risks associated with the
partnership itself and the individual doctors- professional liability, retirement, disability, and competition from former associates.
Malpractice
For several years, the malpractice insurance market has experienced one
crisis after another." Vigorous debates have raged over who is to blame
for the deteriorating situation,17 and legislation has been introduced to bring
the problem under control and to prevent the withdrawal of insurers from
8
Volatile supply and high premiums have made this type of
the market.6
65. For several examples of existing sabbatical policies in clinics, see Altrocchi,
Sabbatical Policy in Group Practice, GRouP PRACTICE, Aug. 1970, at 19.
66. STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1, (Comm. Print 1975) (prepared for the National
Conference on Medical Malpractice, co-sponsored by Congressman James F. Hastings and
the American Group Practice Association) [hereinafter cited as OvERVImw]; see U.S. DEI'T
OF HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 39 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].

67. See, e.g., Annas, Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right?, 10 TRIAL 59 (1974);
Brant, Medical Malpractice: The Disease and How to Cure It, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 152 (1972);
Chon, Practice and Malpractice-The Other Side of the Coin-An Attorney's Viewpoint,
20 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 267 (1974); Demy, Practice and Malpractice (One Doctor's Viewpoint), 1973 MED. TRIAL TECH. ANN. 61; King, Malpractice Prevention: A Bi-professional
Approach, 1971 INs. L.J. 335; Medical Report: Malpractice Crisis, 88 INs. CouNs. J. 521 (1971).
68. For a survey of proposed federal and state legislation on the malpractice problem,
see OvERvIEw, supra note 66, at 36-183.
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insurance a major concern to all doctors. 69 To the extent that private third-

party malpractice insurance remains the conventional means of transferring
professional liability risk,--' there are several objectives that the group's lawyer
should bear in mind.
The partnership and the individual doctors should be insured by one
company, and that same company should carry the clinic's general liability
coverage. Gaps between general and professional liability coverages are thus
avoided, and coordination of legal strategy is facilitated for malpractice
claims involving multiple defendants. Policy limits should be very high;
judging from the trend of awards, a five million dollar policy limit on each
named insured would not be excessive.71 High limits are particularly important
because of the long discovery periods and time for adjudication of malpractice
cases.72 The policy limits that will apply are those that were in force when
the treatment was given, but an award may not be made until several
years later. Thus, today's policy limits may have to satisfy judgments well
in excess of today's awards.
Self-insurance of the malpractice risk is impractical for all but the largest
clinics. The losses involved in malpractice are characteristically low in frequency and high in severity,7 3 and it is this type of loss pattern that most
requires an insurer for spreading the risk. There is the added danger that
the large reserves necessary to fund a self-insurance program will be invested
in frozen clinic assets like buildings and equipment and thus not be readily
available for the payment of claims.
The discipline and mutual supervision inherent in group practice are two
of many reasons that clinics can be regarded as superior professional liability
risks.74 Although actuarial data have not customarily been tabulated to
reflect a group-solo distinction, there has been a recent attempt, with favorable

69. Id. at 16, 18; REPORT, .supra note 66, app., at 494, 541, 552.
70. First-party no-fault coverage for medical injuries has been proposed by some
commentators. Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Aprroach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INs. L.J. 69; Keeton, Conpensalion for Medical Accidents, in OVERVIEW, supra note 66, at 231. One think-tank, however,
has urged retention and improvement of the present malpractice insurance system. Defense
Research Institute, Medical Malpractice Position Paper, 42 INS. COuNS. J. 66 (1975).
71. "For those specialists subject to high exposure (e.g., anesthesiologists, neuro-surgeons,
and orthopedic surgeons), adequate limits are generally considered to be at least $1 million.
Those who wish to be covered for virtually every contingency are generally advised to buy
limits of $3-5 million." REPORT, supra note 66, app., at 548. "The larger companies in the
property and liability field can provide coverage of S10 million or more. In cases where
the individual underwriter is unwilling or unable to provide coverage beyond a certain
limit, the agent of the physician may obtain excess coverage through an additional underwriter." 121 CONG. REC. 1287 (daily ed. March 3, 1975) (medical malpractice background
paper by Congressman Hastings).
72. "Settlements are seldom prompt; the average time for cases heard by a jury is 5
years. It takes over 10 years to settle all alleged medical malpractice incidents occurring in
any one year." Id. at 895 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1975).
73. See REPORT, supra note 66, at 10-12.
74. See Freidson & Rhea, supra note 45, at 123-24; Curran 9- Moseley, The Malpractice
Experience of Health Maintenance Organizations, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 69, 84-86 (1975).
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results, to isolate the presumably superior experience of group practice within
the risk control program of the American Group Practice Association.75
A group should be encouraged by counsel to supplement its natural risk
control advantages by establishing formal and aggressive machinery in its
management structure to reduce the risk of medical misadventure. The formal
commitment to high standards of safety and skill may help to attract and
hold a malpractice insurance carrier.76 A committee for this purpose can
study and eliminate risks in the clinic routine and act quickly to minimize
damages or prevent claims when potential malpractice incidents occur. Such
formal structures can also serve as the nuclei of cooperative programs with
7
local bar associations to screen or evaluate alleged incidents of malpractice.

Retirement
In the early days of group practice, provisions for clinics to pay pensions
to retired members were difficult to build into partnership agreements without
risking severe cash drains on the clinics. 1 The reserving problem was similar
to the self-insurance reserving problem encountered in the malpractice area,75
and retired members had to rely on the group's continued existence for their
pensions. The risk of impecunious retirement for self-employed doctors has
since been greatly relieved by the tax benefits of the Keogh Act, 0 the
availability of incorporation, and the existence of a vigorous pension service
industry.
For a period of several years following the wave of enabling legislation
for professional corporations, the advantages of corporate pension plans over
Keogh plans encouraged many groups to incorporate.8 ' This trend affected
75. "We are implementing a program which in four or five years will give valuable
information in regards to claim experience and requirements for reserves and hopefully
will reduce premium rates. From this may come some indication that measurably high
quality medical practice and a broadly conceived professional liability program can deal
fairly with the needs of our patients and relieve physicians of the dread of malpractice.
threats we are all much aware of currently." Statement of Dr. Joseph B. Davis, Chairman
of the American Group Practice Association Insurance Trustees, before the President's
Commission on Medical Malpractice, March 24, 1972.
76. See REPORT, supra note 66, at 63-64.
77. See Note, New Mexico Medico-Legal Malpractice Panel-An

Analysis, 3 N.M. L.

REv. 311 (1973); Note, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approach to
Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 Wmr. & MARY L. REV. 695, 704 (1972).
78. See Beck, How To Support Members Who Leave, GRouP PRAcnCE, Jan. 1974, at 8.
79. See generally Goshay, Motivations for Self-Insurance, in GROUP INSURANCE HAND-

nOOK 751, 758-59 (R. Eilers & R. Crowe eds. 1965) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
80. Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 809 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The Act allows self-employed persons to deduct certain
contributions to "qualified" pension and profit-sharing plans from their income tax. These
contributions are not taxable income to the plan participants, and they accumulate taxfree to retirement. Self-employed persons were allowed by the original act to deduct up to
the lesser of 10% of their earnings or $2500. "Qualification" of these plans was conditioned
upon compliance with rules regarding eligibility, vesting, distributions, discrimination, and
integration with Social Security. Id.

81. See notes 22-29 supra. For a well-balincegd account of the incorporation of a 17
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even the large groups qualified for especially favorable pension plan provisions under "Super-Keogh" plans that excluded all "owner-employees"
(partners having more than a 10% interest in the assets or earnings)s2 The
$2500 limitation on tax-free pension contributions to Keogh plans was the
most significant disadvantage to self-employed doctors, whose incomes usually
justified a much larger retirement benefit than $2500 a year would provide.
The Pension Reform Act of 1974,13 however, raised the ceiling tax deduction
for self-employed persons to $7500,84 which eliminated a large part of the
tax incentive for incorporation.8 5 The larger corporate pension plan limits
provide significant advantage only to those doctors who earn considerably
more money than the representative clinic doctor and who are willing to
sacrifice a large part of current consumption for greater wealth in old age. 6
There is the further question of whether large shares of personal income
should be committed to pension plans. Pension funds are not as freely
accessible as savings, and attempts to tap them before retirement may invoke
87
heavy tax penalties outweighing their previous tax benefits.
Retirement programs follow two broad funding patterns that may have
intense political implications in medical groups. The "defined benefit" type of
plan,88 widely used in industry, calls for yearly contributions, each calculated
to grow at an assumed rate of interest to a fixed sum at retirement. The older
the participant, the fewer years the contribution will have to grow at interest
and the closer the contribution must be to 100 percent of the ultimate fixed
sum. Therefore, it costs more to fund a fixed retirement benefit for an older
participant than it costs to fund the same benefit for a younger participant.
This system works well in industry, where age correlates somewhat with status
and salary level. In clinic partnerships, however, the younger doctor quickly
reaches equal status with his older partners, and the drastic imbalance in
member multispecialty Florida clinic, see Incorporation: Can You Hack It?, GROUP PRACTICE,
May 1973, at 9.
82. Among other differences, plans covering owner-employees could not delay vesting
of employees' contributions, establish a minimum age requirement for participation, or
integrate (offset) the contributions with Social Security pension benefits. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§401(d)(2)(a), (3), (6). Plans not covering owner-employees were free to include
such provisions, which were also permitted in corporate plans. The superiority of "SuperKeogh" plans has survived the Pension Reform Act of 1974 and has been enhanced in
several respects. See Moore, H.R. 10 Plans Under the Pension Reform Law, 6 TAX ADVISOR
9, 12 (1975). In addition to "Super-Keogh" and "Keogh," the term "mini-Keogh" has been
coined to refer to an Individual Retirement Account established by a self-employed person
in lieu of a qualified plan covering his employees. Gorlick, New Pension Legislation, MED.
ECON., Oct. 14, 1974, at 180, 188; see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§219, 408.
83. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).

84.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §404(e)(1).

85. See notes 22-29 supra.
86. See note 82 supra. A single doctor is in the position to choose to forego large
amounts of income, but a group of doctors may not be able to agree to a plan committing
all of the partners to such a financial policy. See Incorporation: Can You Hack It?, GROUP
PRAcricE, May 1973, at 10.
87. See Moore, supra note 82, at 10.
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §414(j).
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pension contributions occasioned by a defined benefit plan is neither politically
tolerable nor efficient for tax purposes. 89
90
For medical groups, the "defined contribution" type of plan is the
better choice. Such programs call for a contribution formula based on earnings.
The benefit at retirement consists simply of whatever the accumulated contributions will buy. In addition to ameliorating the age discrimination
problem, defined contribution plans are safe from funding inadequacy due
to depressed securities markets and are comparatively free of the funding
provisions of the Pension Reform Act. 91
Disability
The disability risk has two dimensions -the effect of disability on the
doctor's personal finances and the effect of disability on his partnership
interest in the group.
A long-term total disability may have a more catastrophic financial effect
on a doctor's family than death, 92 and the amount of money needed to cover
the disability risk is often more than the face value of the insured's life
insurance. Although disability income (whether from a partnership or from
an insurance company) is supposed to replace earnings, often it must be
applied to heavy medical expenses of the disabled person, leaving little to
93
actually replace income for normal living expenses.
The lawyer should take an active role in the evaluation of the partners'
disability policies and in the selection by the clinic of a group disability insurance program. 4 The definition of disability is the most important element

89. The ideal situation would be for the pension plan to call for a contribution of
exactly $7500 for each partner. If the partners' contributions are drastically unequal, however,
a dilemma arises. If an older partner's contribution is $7500 and a younger partner's contribution is $2000, the younger partner loses potential tax benefits. But if the formula is
raised to increase the younger partner's contribution and concommitant tax savings, the
cost of employees' contributions will increase also and the older partner's contribution over
$7500 will be fully taxable.
90. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §414 (j).
91. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §412. The Act does not exempt the defined contribution
pension plans from funding adequacy, but the very nature of this type of plan makes
most of the funding section inapplicable. A defined contribution plan (money purchase
plan) will be properly funded if the proper annual contribution is made, without regard
to the investment performances of prior contributions or changes in actuarial data. See
P-H PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING, report bull. 6, at 284 (Aug. 16, 1974).
92. Families normally rely on life insurance for protection against loss of the breadwinner, but long-term disability usually does not trigger payment of life insurance face
values. An uncompensated long-term disability can cause severe family hardship: loss of
income, heavy medical costs, loss of educational opportunity, and disruption of the family's
standard of living. The hardship to a single person is much greater. 0. DICKERSON, HEALTH
INSURANCME 26 (1968).
93. Id.
94. See generally Smith, Group Disability Income Benefits, in HANDBOOK, supra note
79, at 373-91.
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of such a plan for doctors; 95 coverage not only should protect the occupation
of "physician" but also should protect each doctor as a specialist. 96
The second most important consideration in evaluating the disability
insurance program is enforcement of the policy. While reported cases on
disability are very favorable to the insured, 97 the more basic problem is that
without good enforcement mechanisms short of litigation, individual insureds
or clinics may not be in a position to press their policy rights and may be
pressured into inadequate settlements.9" The most favorable enforcement
mechanisms are arbitration provisions99 that afford fair representation of the
insured, with minority representation of the insurer, and subscription to association-sponsored plans- ° that exercise mass bargaining power with the
group insurers. All of these considerations bear directly on the group's
own financial security. For example, if the disabled doctor's policy will not
support him in disability, the clinic, as a practical matter, will have to do
so. A medical group has a moral obligation to a disabled partner and an
image to uphold in the community. No clinic can afford the spectacle of one
of its partners suffering financial ruin from disability.
In the instance of total and permanent disability, the group should have
an internal policy for retirement of the doctor from the partnership and
purchase of his interest. Because of the possibility of rehabilitation, a waiting
period can be applied before the retirement takes effect. If a buy-out becomes
necessary, however, the partnership faces a liquidity problem since life insurance will not provide protection where the partner does not die. The
problem should, therefore, be handled with disability buy-out insurance. The
benefits of such a policy can be paid in lump sum or periodic payments to
95.

See W. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH LAw §§15:2-15:6 (1972, Supp. 1974).
96. Id., §15:4. "If a physician has spent his life as a neuro-surgeon or an opthalmic
surgeon he is effectively deprived of his occupation if illness prevents his continuing in
that particular field." Dixon v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1959).
97. One extraordinarily favorable case was Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 53 N.J. 313,
250 A.2d 580 (1969). In addition to several liberal holdings concerning the insured's state
of disability under the policy language, the court held that an insurer has a duty of good
faith that extends beyond merely not injuring a policyholder's rights. An insurer must
affirmatively act to disclose policy rights to the insured where the policy language would
be interpreted more restrictively by a layman than the insurer knows it is interpreted by
the courts. Id. at 328, 250 A.2d at 588 (1969).
98. Disability insurance is designed to pay a stream of benefits to the insured as long
as he is disabled (subject to policy limits), and the guarantee that this income will not
run out prematurely is one of its most valuable features to the disabled person. Insurance
companies, however, actuarialli translate this indefinite stream of income into a lump
sum based on the average duration of a large number of similar disability claims and set
this sum aside as a claim reserve. When a claim is submitted, a company may deny the
claim or threaten delays and then offer the insured a compromise lump sum equal to or
less than the claim reserve. If the claimant accepts the lump sum settlement, the company
has successfully transferred the risk of exhaustible income back to the insured and has
cancelled out one of the significant benefits of its product. See 0. DICKERSON, supra note 92, at
630, 697; H. Ross,

J.
100. See J.

99.

See

SETrLED OUT OF COURT

DONALDSON,

CASUALTY

154-55, 224-29 (1970).

CLAIM

PRACTICE

PICKRELT, GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE

of Associations, in

HANDBOOK,

171

(1969).

92 (1961); Tookey & Tookey, Eligibility

supra note 79, at 609-12.
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the clinic for purchase of the partner's interest, and the coverage may be
for disability only or for disability and death.' 01
Competition
Without some form of protection from the competition of former colleagues, the group is extremely vulnerable to conversion of its goodwill to
the benefit of doctors who may drop out and set up practices in the community
in competition with the group. 0 2 Many doctors join groups directly from
training; 03 others have experience but are new and unknown in the community when they join. In either case, the clinic invests a certain amount of
its goodwill in the doctor whose practice it sponsors, and the start-up costs
of an associate can be formidable. Thus, turnover of newly established
associates can be quite expensive to a clinic in terms of patients and money.
Damage of a more serious nature can result from the withdrawal and subsequent competition of doctors whose specialties are valuable for referrals
or essential to the full-service character of the clinic.
Protection against competition is achieved by including restrictive
covenants in partnership agreements and doctors' employment contracts. 04
These covenants typically prohibit any partner or employed doctor who
leaves the group from practicing medicine during a specified time period
within a certain geographical area, usually a city, county, or area within a
given radius of the clinic. Violation of the covenant is normally enforced by
injunction, though some groups have attempted to enforce liquidated damages
provisions. 05
Medical partnerships have had a high rate of success in enforcing restrictive
covenants by injunction. It is well settled that restrictive covenants that are
reasonable as to duration and territory are exceptions to the rule that
contracts in restraint of trade are unenforceable as against public policy.106
The evil of restraint of trade is subordinated to the solemnity of contracts
freely entered into by the parties.
Reasonableness generally requires a definite time period and a geographical
area roughly corresponding to the range of a medical practice,107 but in-

101. See 0. DICKERsoN, supra note 92, at 664-66; When a Partner Can't Work, GRoup
PRACrICE, May 1972, at 37.
102. See generally Caylor, Restrictive Agreements, in Jordan, supra note 11, at 64.
103. Id.
104. See generally Dodd, Contracts Not To Practice Medicine, 23 BosrON U.L. REv.

305 (1943).
105. See notes 118, 119 infra.
106. See notes 107-120 infra; Burdine v. Brooks, 206 Ga. 12, 55 S.E.2d 605 (1949); Foltz
v. Struxness, 168 Kan. 714, 215 P.2d 133 (1950); Lovelace Clinic v. Murphy, 76 N.M. 645,
417 P.2d 450 (1966); McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Ore. 257, 393 P.2d 774 (1964). See also FLA.
STAT. §542.12 (1975).
107. See, e.g., Raiford v. Kramer, 231 Ga. 757, 204 S.E.2d 171 (1974) (5 county area/2
years); McMurray v. Bateman, 221 Ga. 240, 144 S.E.2d 345 (1965) (50 mile radius/3 years);
Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329 (1956) (city/5 years).
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definite time periods 08 and areas as large as 100 miles in radius 0 9 have been
upheld. In judging the reasonableness of a covenant's terms, the courts have
110
refused to credit allegations that the protection of the clinic is unneeded,
that the competing doctor would be subject to unconscionable hardship
under the covenant's terms,"1 or that the covenant was entered into under
3
duress. 1 12 Findings of unreasonableness are rare."
Proof of damages may be required by some courts, 1 14 but the stronger
position appears to be that no specific damages need be shown in an action
for injunctive relief."15 Enforcement of the covenant may be carried out
selectively by the group, and a tradition of nonenforcement does not constitute
a waiver of the group's rights under the covenant." 6 It is also possible for a
sole remaining partner to enforce the covenant, even though the partnership
ceases to exist when the last two partners disassociate. 1 7 Instead of an outright
prohibition of competing practice, the payment of a specific sum, forfeiture
of accounts receivable, or forfeiture of buy-out payments are required by
some clinics' restrictive covenants."18 These liquidated damages provisions are
coupled with criteria for reasonable duration and territory but are not as
9
favorably received by the courts as those simply prohibiting competition.",
The remaining partners have an interesting tactical advantage in their
enforcement of a restrictive covenant. The doctor hoping to defeat the
covenant after a long association with the clinic may be barred by the
statute of limitations from an action for declaratory judgment to have the
agreement declared void because, for that purpose, the statute runs from the
signing of the agreement. 20 The clinic's cause of action, however, is for
breach of the agreement, and the statute does not begin to run until the
alleged breach occurs. Thus, in such circumstances, the doctor cannot be sure of
108. Storer v. Brock, 351 IIl. 643, 184 N.E. 868 (1933) (city of Chicago); Foster v.
White, 248 App. Div. 541, 290 N.Y.S. 394 (1936) (county). But see Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104
Ga. 188, 30 S.E. 735 (1898) (15 miles).
109. Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 9 S.E.2d 476 (1940) (5 years); Harrington v.
Hackler, 181 Okla. 396, 74 P.2d 388 (1937) (5 years; agreement upheld but area modified
from 100 miles to within county).
110. Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 253 Iowa 541, 112 N.W.2d 678 (1962).
111. Id. See also Canfield v. Spear, 44 Ill. 2d 49, 254 N.E.2d 433 (1969).
112. Lareau v. O'Nan, 355 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Foster v. White, 248
App. Div. 541, 290 N.Y.S. 394 (1936).
113. See, e.g., Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 30 S.E. 735 (1898); Droba v. Berry, 73
Abs. 603, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 50, 139 N.E.2d 124 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1955).
114. See, e.g., Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973); Melrose v. Low, 80 Utah
356, 15 P.2d 319 (1932).
115. See, e.g., Canfield v. Spear, 44 Ill. 2d 49, 254 N.E.2d 433 (1969); Cogley Clinic v.
Martini, 253 Iowa 541, 112 N.W.2d 678 (1962); Lareau v. O'Nan, 355 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1962).
116. Thompson v. Allain, S77 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
117. Ashley v. Lance, 75 Wash. 2d 471. 541 P.2d 916 (1969); Tbickman v. Schunk, 410
P.2d 987 (Wyo. 1966).
118. This device is recommended in H. CoTrON, supra note 36, at 88-89, 91.
119. See Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329 (1956); Melrose v. Low, 80
Utah 356, 15 P.2d 319 (1932).
120. Taylor v. Lovelace Clinic, 78 N.M. 460, 432 P.2d 816 (1967).
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his legal position until he has set up his new practice and has been sued by the
clinic. This risk may be sufficient to deter members' defiance of the covenant.
Although there are practical reasons for the use of restrictive covenants,
there are factors militating against their use. These agreements are clearly
restraints of trade and have received the support of the courts only because
of the great weight that the courts feel they must give to freedom of contract.
Otherwise, the detriment caused to the doctor, his patients, and the community would surely override the interests of the clinic, which usually cannot
show serious damage. The controversy and litigation growing out of a restrictive covenant can also be harmful to the group from the standpoint of
public relations. 12' It has been suggested that the enforcement of restrictive
22
covenants is at odds with the philosophy of group practice.
CONCLUSION

The medical partnership is a business, but most medical partners are

more devoted to their professional pursuits than they are to the business
aspects of medical practice. Indeed, one prominent group doctor has expressed the view that idealistic motives are essential to a group's survival.
[In other words,] the organization which considers the welfare of the
patient paramount and makes everything else subservient to this goal,
is the organization which is likely to succeed, whereas the organization
which is interested primarily in monetary gain usually fails.123
Group doctors are best able to exercise their professional dedication
to the benefit of their patients when the clinic operates under a system that
does not make unreasonable demands on their time and attention. For purposes of organizational design, the clinic is a legal and political system for
which the lawyer is the constitutional draftsman. Conscientious planning of
the medical partnership should result in professional satisfaction to the
lawyer, peace of mind to the doctors, and improved health care to the public.
GEORGE REARDON
121. Caylor, Restrictive Agreements, in Jordan, supra note 11, at 65-66, In one reported
case, the local medical society passed a resolution, which was offered into evidence,
condemning the clinic's action. Hefelfinger v. David, 305 So. 2d 823 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
122. "We countered (the proposal for a restrictive covenant) with the fact that if we
feared such a possibility, then the premise of the group practice was not valid. If we could
not give better service as a group than an individual could alone, the philosophy of group
practice was not sound. We have had a few members of the staff who have left and,
indeed, some of them have taken an occasional patient with them. They have always left,
however, with our blessing and because they were unable to work as a part of a team."
Ochsner, The Need for Teamwork in Medical Care, in NEw HORIZONS, supra note 2, at 70.

123. Id. at 71 (emphasis original).
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